
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
Cardiovascular Consequences of Unfair Pay











University of Bonn and IZA 
 
Ingo Menrath 
Heinrich Heine University, Duesseldorf 
 
Pablo Emilio Verde 
Heinrich Heine University, Duesseldorf 
 
Johannes Siegrist 
Heinrich Heine University, Duesseldorf 
 
 







P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 












Cardiovascular Consequences of Unfair Pay 
 
This paper investigates physiological responses to perceptions of unfair pay. In a simple 
principal agent experiment agents produce revenue by working on a tedious task. Principals 
decide how this revenue is allocated between themselves and their agents. In this 
environment unfairness can arise if an agent’s reward expectation is not met. Throughout the 
experiment we record agents’ heart rate variability. Our findings provide evidence of a link 
between perceived unfairness and heart rate variability. The latter is an indicator of stress-
related impaired cardiac autonomic control, which has been shown to predict coronary heart 
diseases in the long run. Establishing a causal link between unfair pay and heart rate 
variability therefore uncovers a mechanism of how perceptions of unfairness can adversely 
affect cardiovascular health. We further test potential adverse health effects of unfair pay 
using data from a large representative data set. Complementary to our experimental findings 
we find a strong and highly significant association between health outcomes, in particular 
cardiovascular health, and fairness of pay. 
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1. Introduction 
A large and growing body of evidence suggests that fairness perceptions play an important 
role in labor relations, affecting work morale, effort provision and market efficiency (see, e.g., 
Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl 1993; Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger 1997; Altmann, Falk and 
Huffman 2010)
1. This work points out adverse behavioral consequences of unfair pay. The 
present  paper  instead  provides  evidence  on  adverse  effects  at  the  physiological  level.  In 
particular we investigate the potential impact of unfair pay on heart rate variability (HRV). 
The economic importance of studying the relation between fairness perceptions and HRV 
results  from  the  fact  that  the  latter  is  an  early  indicator  of  functional  and  structural 
impairments of the cardiovascular system, which increases the probability of future manifest 
coronary  heart  disease  (Steptoe  and  Marmot  2002,  Dekker  et  al.  (2000),  Gianaros  et  al. 
(2005)).  In  other  words,  establishing  a  causal  link  between  unfair  pay  and  HRV  would 
suggest that on top of behavioral consequences, perceptions of unfair pay can have important 
negative health consequences, in particular on stress-related cardiovascular health.
2 
We proceed in two steps. First, we report results from an experiment that tests our 
hypothesis that fairness perceptions have a causal effect on HRV. Second, and based on this 
main contribution, we analyze data from a large representative data set to check whether 
perceptions of unfair pay are related to health status in the general population.  
The experiment implements a simple principal agent relationship. In the experiment 
the agent produces revenue by working on a tedious task. The principal receives the revenue 
                                                 
1  For  an  overview  and  related  studies,  see  Fehr  and  Gächter  (2000).  The  above  cited 
experimental work is complemented by interview studies with personnel managers (see, e.g., 
Agell and Lundborg 1995; Bewley, 1999, 2005). Akerlof (1982) provides an early theoretical 
analysis of fairness and labor market efficiency. 
2 The global public health and economic burden of cardiovascular disease is immense. By the 
year 2020, coronary heart disease, together with major depression, is estimated to be the 
leading cause of life years lost to premature death and years lived with disability worldwide 
(Mathers,  Lopez  and  Murray  2006).  Among  adult  populations  of  high  income  countries, 
coronary heart disease is the leading cause of death, and cost of illness studies estimate that 
almost one percent of the gross national product is attributable to the direct and indirect costs 
of coronary heart disease (Liu et al. 2002).   3 
produced  by  the  agent  and  decides  how  to  allocate  it  between  the  agent  and  himself. 
Unfairness can arise in this set-up if an agent’s reward expectation is not met, i.e., if an agent 
perceives  his  payment  as  unfairly  low.  The  agents’  HRV  is  monitored  throughout  the 
experiment. 
The  experimental  set-up  allows  us  to  precisely  measure  revenues,  actual  payment 
shares as well as agents’ perceptions of appropriate or unfair pay. In the analysis we use two 
indicators of perceived unfairness. The first one is simply the share agents receive from total 
revenue,  capturing  deviations  from  an  equitable  allocation.  The  second  measure  uses 
subjectively stated perceptions of fair pay, which accounts for heterogeneity in perceptions of 
fairness  and  social  preferences  (Dohmen,  Falk,  Huffman  and  Sunde,  2008;  Fischbacher, 
Gächter and Fehr, 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter 2010). This second measure is defined as 
the discrepancy between actual share and “appropriate” share. Our main hypothesis to be 
tested is an inverse
3 relationship between the degree of unfairness, as measured by our two 
indicators, and HRV, our indicator for impaired cardiac autonomic control. The experimental 
results support this hypothesis. Both measures of unfairness, actual share, and discrepancy 
between actual and  appropriate share, are inversely related to  agents’ degree of impaired 
cardiac autonomic control, measured by HRV. This result is confirmed with elicited survey 
measures for mood, anger, and perceived fairness of the exchange. These survey measures are 
all significantly correlated (in the expected direction) with the two experimental measures of 
fairness. This indicates that agents interpret the experimental outcome in terms of fairness and 
are emotionally affected in a systematic way. 
In light of our causal laboratory evidence and the significance of HRV as an indicator 
for stress-related cardiovascular health, we further tested whether perceptions of unfair pay 
                                                 
3 Note that low heart rate variability is observed, among others, during states of mental stress 
while enhanced heart rate variability occurs during states of mental relaxation (for details and 
references, see Section 2). This is why we expect an inverse relationship between unfairness 
and HRV.   4 
are negatively correlated with health status. We investigate this hypothesis with data from the 
Socio Economic Panel (SOEP), a large data set that is representative for the adult German 
population.  In  particular  we  regress  employees’  subjective  health  status  on  whether  they 
consider their income as fair or unfair. Controlling for a large set of personal as well as labor 
market characteristics (such as net wages, labor market status, occupational status, firm size, 
industry) we find a strong and highly significant association between unfair pay and lower 
subjective health status. Moreover, when we test the effect of unfair pay on the incidence of 
particular diseases, we find that fairness perceptions affect health outcomes related to the 
experience of stress and the nervous system, such as heart disease and blood pressure, while 
no such effect is observed for diseases such as cancer or apoplectic stroke. These results 
provide complementary evidence to our experimental findings. Both demonstrate potential 
negative health effects as a reaction to perceptions of unfair exchange at work.  
Our  work  is  related  to  epidemiological  research,  suggesting  that  people  who  are 
confined  to  demanding  jobs  that  fail  to  compensate  efforts  by  “adequate”  rewards  are  at 
increased risk of suffering from stress-related disorders, such as cardiovascular disease and 
depression (for a review, see Siegrist, 2005). Other studies suggest that economic inequality 
in general contributes to the development of cardiovascular disease in a significant way.
4 
Different from our experimental approach, however, it is generally difficult to establish causal 
relationships with epidemiological data. Moreover, reliable measures of perceived fairness of 
pay as well as large sets of control variables are typically not available. Finally, uncovering 
specific psychobiological processes that are elicited by experienced unfairness requires the 
use of biomarkers.  
                                                 
4 This was documented in epidemiological investigations using different indicators such as 
low income (McDonough et al. 1997), income inequality (Kennedy et al. 1996; Wilkinson 
1996), or perceived unfairness resulting from an imbalance between efforts spent and rewards 
received at work (Bosma et al. 1998; Kivimäki et al. 2002; Kuper et al. 2002; Lynch, Kaplan 
and Shema 1997). Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) discuss large-scale effects of inequality.   5 
In the next section we present our experimental design as well as our hypotheses. 
Section 3 reports our main results, section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Experimental design and procedural details 
We implemented a simple principal agent relationship. Upon arrival to the lab, subjects were 
assigned to the role of an agent or a principal. Subjects received all instructions via computer 
screen. We used z-Tree as computer software (Fischbacher 2007). Agents received a pile of 
numbered sheets. On each sheet there was a table containing a large number of zeros and 
ones. The work task was to count the correct number of zeros for a given sheet and to type it 
into the computer. Working time was 25 minutes. Each correctly entered number per sheet 
created revenue of 3 Euro. The accumulated revenue was shown to agents on the screen. 
Agents  were  explicitly  told  that  they  could  complete  as  many  sheets  as  they  wanted  to, 
including to complete no sheet at all. Principals did not work and were told that they were free 
to do things like reading newspapers or doing homework. After the 25 minute working time 
was  over  each  principal  was  informed  about  the  accumulated  revenue  and  was  asked  to 
allocate  it  between  himself  and  the  agent.  Before  the  principal’s  allocation  decision  was 
communicated to the agent, the latter was asked to state the amount of money he considers an 
“appropriate  pay”.  This  information  was  not  revealed  to  principals.  The  agent  was  then 
informed  about  the  principal’s  actual  allocation  decision.  Starting  with  this  feedback, the 
agent was given a time window of 4 minutes to silently cope with this information. This time 
window was selected for analysis of HRV.  
At the end of the experiment we ran a short survey. We elicited psychometrically 
validated measures of general mood (Steyer et al. 1997) and anger (Spielberger 1988). In 
addition, we measured perceived fairness of the economic exchange using the item: “In your 
view, how fair was the return you received from your principal?”. Answers were given on a 5-
point Likert-scale.   6 
Subjects were students from the University of Bonn studying various majors except 
economics.  They  gave  their  informed  consent  to  participate  in  the  experiment.  Exclusion 
criteria were the use of medication with potential interference with cardiovascular function or 
the  presence  of  a  chronic  disease  condition,  such  as  hypertension,  cardiac  arrhythmias, 
coronary heart disease, or diabetes. In total 80 subjects participated in the experiment (40 
principals and 40 agents). During the process of data analysis, we had to exclude data of 10 
subjects  in  the  role  of  agents,  due  to  incomplete  or  invalid  heart  rate  measurements.  As 
registration  of  cardiovascular  parameters  was  restricted  to  the  group  of  agents,  the  main 
analysis is based on 30 subjects in the role of agents with complete data. Note that the 10 
subjects that were excluded due to incomplete heart rate measurements were not different 
neither in their behavior nor treatment by their principals, compared to the 30 subjects the 
analysis is based on (see Footnote 6).  
The physiological measures of the agents’ autonomic nervous system activity were 
heart rate (HR) and heart rate variability (HRV) as established indicators of stress-related 
activation of the autonomic nervous system (Task Force 1996; Steptoe and Marmot, 2002). 
Cardiac autonomic control is assessed by continuously monitoring heart rate and HRV. This 
latter measure reflects the continuous interaction of sympathetic and vagal influence on heart 
rate,  indicating  an  individual’s  capacity  to  generate  regulated  physiological  responses  to 
demanding situations (Appelhans and Luecken 2006). Low HRV mirrors a decreased vagal 
tone with sympathetic predominance and is observed, among others, during states of mental 
stress (von Borella et al. 2007). Conversely, enhanced HRV occurs during states of mental 
relaxation (Vermunt and Steensma, 2005).
5  
                                                 
5  At  the  beginning  of  the  experiment  a  polar  F810i  device  (polar  electro  OY,  Kempele, 
Finland) was attached to record and store time intervals between consecutive heart beats (IBI, 
inter-beat-interval). Agents were instructed to remain seated during the whole experiment and 
to restrict all movements, with the exception of their dominant arm operating the computer. 
The target time window for physiological recordings lasted 4 minutes. Data were transmitted 
to a PC, stored, and analyzed offline by a researcher who was blind to the psychological   7 
3. Results 
In this section we present our main results. We first report our findings from the experiment. 
Second, we briefly investigate the relation between perceptions of unfairness and health status 
using representative data.  
 
3.1. Experimental results 
In our analysis we focus on two measures of how fair the principals’ allocation decisions are 
perceived. The first one is simply the actual share received s, i.e., the ratio of received pay by 
an agent i, πi, and total revenue, ri, i.e., si = πi/ri. The lower the actual share, the higher is the 
difference between performance-related and actually received payment. Our second fairness 
measure  allows  for  subjectively  different  perceptions  of  fairness  and  uses  each  agent’s 
individual perception of an appropriate pay, πi’. The appropriate share, ai, is therefore ai = 
πi’/ri. Our second fairness indicator measures the discrepancy between actual and appropriate 
share. It is defined as di = si/ai.
6 A value of one implies that the principal exactly meets the 
expectation of the agent, values below one indicate a disadvantageous discrepancy between 
actual and appropriate payment.  
                                                                                                                                                       
outcome measures. After visualizing and manually correcting data for artefacts a smoothness 
priors method was used to remove trends of the IBI time series. Then, a HR time series was 
derived and the following time-domain based HRV indices were calculated: SD-IBI (standard 
deviation of the IBI series), SD-HR (standard deviation of the HR series), and RMSSD-IBI 
(root mean square of successive differences of the IBI series) (Niskanen et al. 2002).  The 
RMSSD-IBI  represents  a  sensitive  index  of  parasympathetically-dominated,  respiratory 
related,  fast  fluctuations  of  HR,  and  can  be  calculated  with  milliseconds  precision.  It  is 
considered to accurately index resting vagal tone directed to the heart and was documented to 
be rather resistant to the biasing effects of breathing (Penttilä et al. 2001). As SD-IBI and SD-
HR  are  highly  correlated  with  RMSSD-IBI  we  restrict  the  presentation  of  findings  to 
RMSSD-IBI as a robust and well validated time-domain based indicator of parasympathetic 
cardiac  control.  All  calculations  were  done  with  a  computer  program  for  advanced  HRV 
analysis (Niskanen et al. 2002). 
6 Conceptually we like to introduce di in terms of shares, but of course di can also expressed 
as di = si/ai = πi/ πi’. Note that higher values of di imply less discrepancy.   8 
In  Table  1  we  report  means  and  standard  deviations  of  our  main  variables
7.  On 
average agents produced a total revenue of 20.9 Euro and indicated that they would consider 
an average share of 0.66 as appropriate. This contrasts sharply with what agents actually 
received. On average agents were paid an actual share, s = 0.43, i.e., principals allocated 43 
percent of total revenue to their agents. Averaging all individual differences between actual 
and appropriate share leads to a mean score of di of 0.69, which is clearly below 1.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation 
Total Revenue produced by agents (ri) (in Euro)  20.9  8.57 
Actual share (si)  0.43  0.14 
Appropriate share (ai)  0.66  0.16 
Discrepancy (di = si/ai)  0.69  0.29 
Fairness Questionnaire (scale: 1-5; higher values 
imply “more fair”) 
2.56  1.43 
Mood Questionnaire (scale: 4-20; higher values 
imply “better mood”) 
13.27  4.38 
Anger Questionnaire (scale: 10-40; higher values 
imply “more anger”) 
18.20  8.28 
Heart rate variability (RMSSD)  32.33  11.25 
Mean and standard deviation (SD) for each variable included in the analysis (N = 30). 
Actual share is the ratio of received pay by the agent, πi, and total revenue, ri, i.e., si = πi/ri. 
Appropriate share is the ratio of appropriate pay, πi’, and total revenue, ri, i.e., a = πi’/ri.  
 
 
Figure 1 displays the discrepancy between appropriate and actual share individually for all 
agents. The figure shows that almost all agents thought that they should get at least fifty 
percent of total revenue. Moreover, almost all observations are below the 45-degree line, 
meaning that, with very few exceptions, agents actually received less than they thought would 
                                                 
7 Table 1 reports data for the 30 subjects with complete heart rate measurement. Subjects with 
incomplete measurement were not different in any systematic way. For example total revenue 
for  this  group  was  20.2  (Std.  dev.  7.23),  which  is  not  significantly  different  from  total 
revenues reported in Table 1 (OLS regression with a dummy for excluded subjects yields a p-
value  of  0.809).  Corresponding  p-values  are  0.412,  0.881  and  0.610  for  actual  shares, 
appropriate shares and agents’ profits, respectively. 
   9 
be appropriate. The figure also shows that the discrepancy between actual and appropriate 
shares  varies  considerably  between  subjects,  i.e.,  the  experiment  generates  substantial 
variation in perceived fairness violations. This heterogeneity and the fact that principals were 
randomly assigned to agents allows testing our main hypothesis.  
Figure 1: Discrepancy between actual and appropriate share received by agents. Actual share 
is defined as ratio between actual payment and total revenue; appropriate share is defined as 




Figures 2(a) and 2(b) plot the two measures of perceived fairness against HRV, measured by 
RMSSD
8, during the observation period. Figure 2(a) shows a positive correlation between 
actually received share and HRV. Thus, as hypothesized, the higher the perceived unfairness, 
the lower is HRV. The Spearman rank correlation between these two variables is significant 
at any conventional level (Spearman’s rho = 0.46; p<0.01). Figure 2(b) plots HRV against our 
measure  for  discrepancy,  i.e.,  the  ratio  between  actually  received  and  appropriate  share. 
Again,  the  correlation  is  positive  and  significant  (Spearman’s  rho  =  0.53,  p<0.01).  Put 
differently, the higher the discrepancy between obtained and appropriate rewards, the lower is 
                                                 
8 See Footnotes 2 and 4.   10 
mean HRV. Both results are confirmed by regression analyses, shown in Table 2, where 
coefficients for HRV are positive and significant both for actual share (p<0.01) as well as 
discrepancy (p<0.01), respectively
9. We also find a significant relation between self-reported 
perception of fairness and HRV, again indicating an inverse relation between the degree of 
unfairness and HRV (p<0.01). 
 
Figure 2(a): Relation between actual share and heart rate variability (RMSSD). The line is a 





                                                 
9 Results remain basically unchanged if we include total revenue as a control. Note further 
that HRV is not related to agents’ work effort. When we regress total revenue (ri) on HRV the 
coefficient is insignificant (OLS regression, N=30, t = 0.72). Regressions are available on 
request.   11 
Figure 2(b): Relation between discrepancy and heart rate variability (RMSSD). Discrepancy 
is defined as ratio between actual and appropriate share. The lower the value for discrepancy, 
the larger is the discrepancy between actual and appropriate shares. The line is a weighted 






Table 2: Heart rate variability regressions 
Dependent variable: Heart rate variability (RMSSD) 
Actual share   38.17***     
  [12.77]     
Discrepancy    18.87***   
    [6.29]   
Fairness (survey measure)      0.0668*** 
      [.0204] 
Constant  15.84**  19.35***  0.4048 
  [5.81]  [4.69]  [0.6986] 
Observations  30  30  30 
R-squared  0.24  0.24  0.28 
OLS regressions with standard errors in brackets. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. 
 
 
Table  3  confirms  that  our  two  experimental  measures  for  perceived  unfairness  reflect 
subjects’  perceptions  and  emotions.  General  mood,  anger,  and  perceived  fairness  are  all   12 
significantly correlated in the expected direction with actual share and discrepancy. Subjects 
report being in a better mood, experience less anger and perceive payments as less unfair the 
higher the actual share and the lower the discrepancy between actual and appropriate share. 
 
Table 3: Correlations of experimental and survey measures 
  Actual share  Discrepancy 
Fairness  0.70***  0.79*** 
Mood  0.56***  0.59*** 
Anger  - 0.58***  - 0.70*** 
Spearman rank correlations. *** indicate significance at 1-percent level; Number of 
observations = 30. 
 
 
3.2 Fairness perceptions and health: representative data 
Our experimental data show that the perception of an unfairly low wage induces impaired 
cardiac  autonomic  control.  In  view  of  the  significance  of  our  measure  for  stress  related 
cardiovascular health, our results suggest potential effects on health outcomes as a reaction to 
perceptions of unfair exchange at work. In other words, we would expect that if perceptions 
of unfair pay constitute a chronic source of stress, unfair pay should be negatively related to 
health status. In the following we investigate this issue in the context of the German labor 
market by analyzing data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP). Of course, 
one should interpret cross-sectional field results with care: unlike with the experimental data 
we cannot exclude the possibility of reversed causality. Nevertheless, we think that exploiting 
complementarities between controlled lab and large-scale field data is useful and that finding 
similar patterns in lab and field data is suggestive for the importance and  systematics of 
fairness perceptions and health outcomes.
10 
The SOEP is a representative panel survey of the adult population living in Germany. 
All members over the age of 17 of a household in the sample are asked for a wide range of 
                                                 
10 For a discussion of lab and field data, see Falk and Heckman (2009).   13 
personal and household information, and for their attitudes on assorted topics.
11 Each wave 
records information on the respondents’ current labor market status, including wages. The 
2009 wave of the SOEP included an item regarding perceived fairness of wage payments. In 
particular the question asks: “Do you consider the income that you get at your current job as 
fair?” Possible answers were either “yes” or “no”. The 2009 wave also contains items about 
health  status,  in  particular  about  subjective  health  status  in  general  and  whether  various 
diseases have been diagnosed in the past. The question about health status in general reads as 
follows: “How would you describe your current health status?”. Responses were given on a 
five-point scale ranging from “very good” to “bad”. While subjective health indicators have 
their limitations, previous research in health economics suggests that responses to subjective 
health status questions predict labor market outcomes, health impairments and mortality.
12  
A more “objective” measure can be constructed from answers to the question whether 
a  physician  has  “ever  diagnosed”  a  particular  disease,  mentioned  in  a  list.  Analyzing 
responses to this question is particularly interesting as it allows a more precise test of our 
hypothesis:  Since  impaired  cardiac  autonomic  control  is  of  particularly  significance  for 
cardiovascular health, we hypothesize that perceptions of unfair pay predict stress related 
diseases such as heart disease, blood pressure and depression, rather than diseases such as 
cancer  or  asthma.  Finding  such  selective  associations  would  suggest  that  fairness  affects 
cardiac control and that the effects measured in the lab extend to our large representative 
sample. We first show results for general subjective health status before we discuss specific 
health outcomes.  
                                                 
11 For more details on the SOEP, see www.diw.de/gsoep/ and Schupp and Wagner (2002). 
12 For a comprehensive discussion of the literature, measurement issues, reporting biases and 
effects on labor market outcomes, see Currie and Madrian (1999). They discuss potential 
limitations of subjective health measures but also point out that self-reported measures are 
good  indicators  of  health  as  they  are  highly  correlated  with  medically  determined  health 
status. The authors thank Janet Currie for suggesting to check for selective associations.   14 
In Table 4 we report OLS estimates in order to assess how health status is related to 
perceptions of unfair pay.
13 Column (1) shows a highly significant fair wage coefficient (t-
value: -10.50). Respondents who consider their income as fair report a significantly better 
health status. Since fairness perceptions may simply reflect higher wage levels we control for 
net wages. We also control for age and gender. Higher net wages and age have a significant 
effect  on  self-reported  health  status  in  the  expected  directions.  Column  (2)  adds  further 
controls, which may simultaneously affect fairness perceptions and health status, respectively. 
These include marital status, whether the respondent lives in East Germany, labor market 
status (e.g., part time vs. full time), educational background, firm size, occupational status 
(e.g.,  blue  collar  vs.  white  collar)  and  type  of  industry. The  precise  specification  and  all 
coefficients are shown in Table  A1 in the Appendix. While the effect of net wages gets 
considerably smaller and insignificant, the fair wage coefficient remains virtually unchanged. 
This means that irrespective of wage level, educational background, labor market conditions, 
industry and labor market status, health status is strongly associated with how fair wages are 
perceived.  
 
                                                 
13 We get the same results using Ordered Probit estimations.   15 
Table 4: Relation between subjective health status and fairness perceptions (SOEP) 
Dependent variable: subjective health status 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Fair wage  -0.179***  -0.171***  -0.178*** 
  [0.017]  [0.018]  [0.019] 
Net wage * 1000  -0.053***  -0.018  -0.019 
  [0.008]  [0.011]  [0.012] 
Age  0.020***  0.017***  0.018*** 
  [0.001]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
Female  -0.002  0.052**  0.048** 
  [0.017]  [0.022]  [0.023] 
Constant  1.801***  1.988***  1.936*** 
  [0.033]  [0.141]  [0.162] 
Further controls  no  yes  Yes 
Sample restriction  no  no  Yes 
Observations  10,279  8,784  8,063 
R-squared  0.083  0.124  0.127 
OLS estimates, standard errors in brackets. The dependent variable measures the subjective 
health status on a five-point scale from “very good” to “bad”. ***, **, * indicate significance 
at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. “Fair wage” is a dummy variable equal to one if 
the  respondent  answered  the  question  “Do  you consider  the  income  that you get at your 
current job as fair?” with “yes” and zero otherwise. Additional controls include marital status 
(married, widowed, divorced), whether the respondent lives in East Germany in 2005, labor 
market  status  (working  in  public  sector,  tenure,  full  time  and  part  time  experience), 
educational background (highest schooling degree: (Realschule, Fachoberschulreife, Abitur, 
other schooling degree, no schooling degree, missing), dummies for firm size (below 5, 6-10, 
11-20,  21-100, 101-200, 201-2000, more than 2000, missing), occupational status (unskilled 
blue collar worker, blue collar craftsman, blue collar foreman, blue collar master, white collar 
unskilled, white collar skilled, white collar craftsman, white collar master, white collar high 
qualified,  white  collar  management,  civil  servant,  civil  servant  intermediate,  civil  servant 
high,  civil  servant  executive),  industry  code  (agriculture,  energy,  mining,  manufacturing, 
construction, trade, transport, bank/insurance, services, missing). Sample restrictions imply 
excluding the inactive (military and civil  service, disabled), those who just started in the 
current firm and whose income information therefore does not refer to the current employer, 
self-employed, and those with net wage of zero. For more detailed information see Table A1 
in the Appendix.  
 
In Column (3) of Table 4 we exclude some employees for whom the relation between fairness 
perceptions of their income and health status is less plausible. This includes in particular those 
employees who just started in their current firm and whose income information (net wage) 
therefore does not refer to the current employer, as well as self-employed employees who 
largely determine their income themselves. Results in Column (3) show that the fair wage 
coefficient is slightly larger than in Column (2). Inspecting all coefficients in Columns (2) and   16 
(3) of Table A1 reveals that most control variables have no significant effect on health status 
such  as  industry  or firm  size.  However,  there  are  notable  exceptions  such  as  gender  and 
occupational status. The higher qualified an employee, the better is his or her health status. 
There  is  also  a  strong  effect  of  personality  measured  in  terms  of  the  Big-5  inventory. 
Conscientiousness, extraversion and agreeableness are all positively related with better health 
conditions.
14 Neuroticism, on the other hand, is strongly negatively associated with health. 
We now move on to the analysis of specific diseases. Table 5 summarizes results from 
27 regressions using the same specifications as in Columns (1) to (3) in Table 4 for nine 
specific diseases listed in the SOEP survey.
15 We also constructed a Body Mass Index (BMI) 
as an additional “objective” health outcome.
16 Since, with the exception of BMI, outcomes are 
binary (diagnosed vs. not diagnosed) we use Probit estimates. The stars indicate significance 
of the fair wage coefficient, “n.s.” indicates non significance. We hypothesized that the fair 
wage coefficient should be selectively significant for diseases that are related to stress and 
impaired cardiac control. This is largely what we find: While perceptions of fairness have a 
highly  significant  effect  on  heart  disease  and  blood  pressure  and  to  a  lesser  extent  on 
depression, we find only weak or insignificant results for BMI, cancer, asthma, apoplectic 
stroke and migraine. With the exception of diabetes, which is also highly significantly related 
to fairness perceptions, we thus find very plausible selective associations. In sum, the results 
from our representative data analysis yield similar and supporting conclusions to our findings 
from the lab. 
                                                 
14 The Big-5 can be broadly classified as follows: Openness to experience (appreciation for 
art, emotion, adventure, and unusual ideas; imaginative and curious), conscientiousness (a 
tendency  to  show  self-discipline,  act  dutifully,  and  aim  for  achievement),  extroversion  (a 
tendency to seek stimulation and the company of others), agreeableness (a tendency to be 
compassionate  and  cooperative  rather  than  suspicious  and  antagonistic  towards  others), 
neuroticism (a tendency to easily experience unpleasant emotions such as anxiety, anger, or 
depression). 
15 All regressions are available on request. 
16 BMI is often used as a health indicator (see Currie and Madrian (1999). Since BMI is not a 
binary variable we ran OLS instead of Probit regressions.   17 
Table 5: Relation between specific diseases and fairness perceptions (SOEP) 
  Significance of the fair wage coefficient 
Disease  Model (1)  Model (2)  (Model 3) 
Heart disease  ***  ***  *** 
Blood pressure  ***  ***  *** 
Diabetes  ***  ***  *** 
Depression  *  *  * 
Body Mass Index  *  n.s.  * 
Cancer  n.s.  n.s.  n.s. 
Asthma  n.s.  n.s.  n.s. 
Apoplectic stroke  n.s.  n.s.  n.s. 
Migraine  n.s.  n.s.  n.s. 
Regression models (1) to (3) refer to the exact same specifications as in Columns (1) to 
(3) in Table 4. We use Probit estimations, except for Body Mass Index (OLS). ***, **, * 
indicate  significance  of  the  fair  wage  coefficient  at  1-,  5-,  and  10-percent  level, 




4. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have established a causal link between the experience of unfair pay and heart 
rate variability: A higher mismatch between actual pay and fair pay goes along with lower 
heart  rate  variability.  Low  heart  rate  variability  reflects  stress  and  an  impaired  balance 
between  the  sympathetic  and  the  vagal  nervous  system,  and  has  been  shown  to  predict 
coronary heart disease in the long run. Our findings therefore suggest that perceptions of 
unfair pay affect the efficiency of labor relations not only by reducing work morale, but also 
by adversely affecting the health status of the workforce. In line with this argument we report 
regression results based on a large representative data set (SOEP) showing that health status is 
in fact negatively correlated with subjective perceptions of unfairness. Moreover, we discuss 
outcomes on specific diseases and show selective associations that are predicted if fairness 
perceptions affect the nervous system.    18 
On a more general level our findings show that our body registers and systematically 
processes social and cotextual information (see also Fliessbach et al. 2007). We find that 
perceptions and beliefs can have important physiological consequences. In our representative 
data we show that on top of actual life circumstances, such as net wages and labor market 
status,  mere  perceptions  about  fair  treatment  are  correlated  with  adverse  physiological 
responses.  Given  that  health  affects  labor  market  outcomes,  this  suggests  an  important 
potential feed-back mechanism: Labor market experience induces fairness perceptions with 
consequences  for  health,  which  in  turn  affect  labor  market  outcomes.  This  environment-
belief-body  feedback  mechanism  suggests  potential  viscous  circles  and  complementary 
effects, which deserve further study in future work.  
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Table A1: Relation between subjective health status and fairness perceptions (SOEP) 
Dependent variable: subjective health status 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Fair wage  -0.179***  -0.171***  -0.178*** 
  [0.017]  [0.018]  [0.019] 
Net wage * 1000  -0.053***  -0.018  -0.019 
  [0.008]  [0.011]  [0.012] 
Age  0.020***  0.017***  0.018*** 
  [0.001]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
Female  -0.002  0.052**  0.048** 
  [0.017]  [0.022]  [0.023] 
Public sector    0.018  0.018 
    [0.026]  [0.027] 
Tenure    -0.001  -0.001 
    [0.001]  [0.001] 
Experience full time    0.005**  0.004* 
    [0.002]  [0.002] 
Experience part time    0.003  0.002 
    [0.003]  [0.003] 
Realschule    -0.028  -0.011 
    [0.025]  [0.026] 
Fachoberschulreife    0.014  0.024 
    [0.040]  [0.041] 
Abitur    -0.067**  -0.037 
    [0.031]  [0.033] 
Other schooling degree    -0.035  -0.018 
    [0.043]  [0.046] 
No degree    0.126  0.163* 
    [0.085]  [0.094] 
In school    0.015  -0.016 
    [0.142]  [0.394] 
School info missing    -0.049  -0.039 
    [0.050]  [0.053] 
Lives in East Germany    -0.055**  -0.066*** 
    [0.022]  [0.023] 
Firm size 5    -0.210**  -0.161 
    [0.103]  [0.128] 
Firm size 10    -0.155  -0.063 
    [0.103]  [0.127] 
Firm size 20    -0.146  -0.073 
    [0.103]  [0.127] 
Firm size 100    -0.123  -0.048 
    [0.100]  [0.124] 
Firm size 200    -0.145  -0.085 
    [0.102]  [0.126] 
Firm size 2000    -0.148  -0.082 
    [0.101]  [0.124] 
Firm size above 2000    -0.115  -0.046 
    [0.101]  [0.124] 
Firm size missing    0.000  0.000 
    [0.000]  [0.000]   24 
Dependent variable: subjective health status 
Blue collar unskilled    0.037  0.009 
    [0.047]  [0.057] 
Blue collar craftsman    0.016  0.016 
    [0.035]  [0.035] 
Blue collar foreman    0.086  0.088 
    [0.065]  [0.065] 
Blue collar master    -0.099  -0.094 
    [0.096]  [0.096] 
White collar master    0.205*  0.210* 
    [0.118]  [0.120] 
White collar skilled    -0.004  0.009 
    [0.037]  [0.040] 
White collar unskilled    -0.021  -0.003 
    [0.046]  [0.056] 
White collar craftsman    -0.082***  -0.078** 
    [0.031]  [0.033] 
White collar high qualified    -0.143***  -0.142*** 
    [0.038]  [0.039] 
White collar manager    -0.089  -0.100 
    [0.072]  [0.074] 
Civil servant low    -0.148  -0.138 
    [0.200]  [0.199] 
Civil servant intermediate    0.025  0.028 
    [0.070]  [0.070] 
Civil servant high    -0.083  -0.090 
    [0.058]  [0.059] 
Civil servant excecutive    -0.138**  -0.154** 
    [0.069]  [0.070] 
Married    -0.000  -0.005 
    [0.025]  [0.026] 
Widowed    0.004  0.001 
    [0.075]  [0.080] 
Divorced    0.003  -0.003 
    [0.036]  [0.037] 
Industry missing    0.044  -0.017 
    [0.101]  [0.106] 
Industry energy    0.093  0.047 
    [0.117]  [0.119] 
Industry mining    0.093  -0.028 
    [0.184]  [0.188] 
Industry manufacturing    0.018  -0.026 
    [0.084]  [0.087] 
Industry construction    0.005  -0.049 
    [0.085]  [0.088] 
Industry trade    0.059  -0.015 
    [0.085]  [0.088] 
Industry transport    0.072  0.006 
    [0.090]  [0.094] 
Industry bank/insurance    0.038  -0.019 
    [0.093]  [0.096] 
Industry services    0.029  -0.026 
    [0.083]  [0.087] 
       
         25 
Dependent variable: subjective health status 
Openness    -0.011  -0.013 
    [0.010]  [0.010] 
Conscientiousness    -0.066***  -0.066*** 
    [0.010]  [0.010] 
Extraversion    -0.025***  -0.024** 
    [0.009]  [0.010] 
Agreeableness    -0.048***  -0.050*** 
    0.016  0.016 
Neuroticism    0.104***  0.110*** 
    [0.009]  [0.009] 
       
Constant  1.801***  1.988***  1.936*** 
  [0.033]  [0.141]  [0.162] 
Observations  10,279  8,784  8,063 
R-squared  0.083  0.124  0.127 
 
OLS estimates, standard errors in brackets. The dependent variable measures the subjective 
health status on a five-point scale from “very good” to “bad”. ***, **, * indicate significance 
at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. “Fair wage” is a dummy variable equal to one if 
the  respondent  answered  the  question  “Do  you consider  the  income  that you get at your 
current job as fair?” with “yes” and zero otherwise. Additional controls include marital status 
(married, widowed, divorced), whether the respondent lives in East Germany in 2005, labor 
market  status  (working  in  public  sector,  tenure,  full  time  and  part  time  experience), 
educational background (highest schooling degree: (Realschule, Fachoberschulreife, Abitur, 
other schooling degree, no schooling degree, missing), dummies for firm size (below 5, 6-10, 
11-20,  21-100, 101-200, 201-2000, more than 2000, missing), occupational status (unskilled 
blue collar worker, blue collar craftsman, blue collar foreman, blue collar master, white collar 
unskilled, white collar skilled, white collar craftsman, white collar master, white collar high 
qualified,  white  collar  management,  civil  servant,  civil  servant  intermediate,  civil  servant 
high,  civil  servant  executive),  industry  code  (agriculture,  energy,  mining,  manufacturing, 
construction, trade, transport, bank/insurance, services, missing). Sample restrictions imply 
excluding the inactive (military and civil  service, disabled), those who just started in the 
current firm and whose income information therefore does not refer to the current employer, 
self-employed, and those with net wage of zero. 
 
 
 